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From `Catholicism Against Modernity'  
 
to the Problematic `Modernity of Catholicism' 
 
Staf Hellemans — Katholieke Theologische Universiteit, Utrecht 
 
 
Since the French Revolution the relationship 
between the Catholic church and modernity has 
always been very troublesome. First I will describe 
how the church saw its own position with regard to 
modernity and how its stance evolved. In a second 
stage, I will then focus on how modernity `framed' 
Catholicism: this I will refer to as the modernity 
and modernization of Catholicism. The insights 
obtained will be used in a third part in order to get a 
better understanding of the present and future 
situation of the church. I will round off with some 
conclusions concerning Catholic intellectuals and 
Catholic intellectual traditions from 1800 onwards. 
 
The Catholic Church versus Modernity 
 
In his book Roman Catholicism: The Search for 
Relevance, published in 1980, Bill MacSweeney 
distinguishes three periods in the church's attitude 
to modernity: rejection of modernity up to 1878, 
competition with modernity from 1878 to 1962, 
from then on a partnership with modernity 
(MacSweeney, 1980: XIII-XV, 236-239). Twenty 
years later, with John Paul II's pontificate in mind, I 
propose adding a fourth period: that of the counter-
voice. Let us quickly run through these four 
periods. 
 From the time of the French Revolution until 
1960, the position of the Catholic church vis-à-vis 
modernity can be summarized by the word `anti-
thesis'. The church condemned modernity for its 
godlessness, which is understandable knowing that 
it had been a cornerstone of the Ancien Régime and 
that, as such, it had experienced a very traumatic 
period during the French Revolution. What strikes 
me is the intensity and determination with which 
the church condemned the new social structure. In 
harsh words, Gregory XVI's encyclical letter Mirari 
vos (1832) condemned Lamennais's proposals to 
welcome the new society and its civil liberties as an 
opportunity for Catholicism. The text states: “At 
the present moment a brutal malevolence and 
impudent science, an unrestrained arbitrariness 
prevail” (“Alacris exultat improbitas, scientia 
impudens, dissoluta licentia” - Gregorius XVI, 
1832:6). A couple of decades later, in 1864, Pius 
IX concluded his Syllabus Errorum by condemning 
the position, from his perspective the acme of all 
deviations, that “the Pope would have to learn to 
accept progress, liberalism and modern 
civilization” (“Romanus Pontifex potest ac debet 
cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum recenti 
civilitate sese reconciliari et componere” — Pius 
IX, 1864, nr. 80). He considered modernity, 
“present-day civilization” as the result of “criminal 
plans by malevolent people” (“nefariis iniquorum 
hominum molitionibus” — Pius IX, 1864:1). They 
had provoked unlawful revolutions against the legal 
order. From the church's point of view, any form of 
participation in such a society was fundamentally 
wrong since its liberties and policies undermined 
the prominent role of the church in society. This 
general outlook did not change until Vatican II. It 
explains the Vatican's weak position toward right-
wing dictatorships and its distrust of democratic 
political systems.  
 Until 1960, antithesis remained the fundamental 
position of the church toward modernity. Nev-
ertheless, the way in which the church fought 









in 1846, Pius IX did indeed work diligently to 
restore Catholicism: the church went through a 
solid centralization process, the community of 
believers was incited to exhibit more intensive 
religious behaviour, devotional social life was 
further developed. Outside the religious sphere 
however, he would continue to propagate passivity, 
“non componere”, i.e., a rejection of the modern 
world with which believers should not be and 
would not want to be associated. The Vatican's 
“non expedit” forced Catholic politicians in Italy 
following the unification of 1870 to stay out of 
Italian politics. It would become the model for all 
other `liberal' countries. With Leo XIII (1878-1903) 
this compulsive passivity outside the sphere of 
religion disappeared. Catholics were now urged to 
actively unite and to engage themselves in all kinds 
of domains. By then it had become clear that 
modern society was more than a revolutionary 
chaos that would soon collapse. Modernity proved 
to be more stable and more organized and, although 
not considered as a positive force, it seemed to be 
less devilish than the church had at first thought. 
Instead of a passive, total rejection, a lot of work 
was now put into the organization of a Catholic 
counter-movement which was to profoundly 
reshape modernity. Still in line with the idea of 
antithesis, the church entered into competition with 
secular modernity. In this way, a full-fledged and 
well-organized Catholic subculture, a Catholic 
`pillar' or `compartment' within society — in other 
words a counter-society — was established over the 
years, in anticipation of a future `Catholic 
modernity'. It resembles what the Socialist Labour 
Movement was doing around the same time. Not 
for nothing did many compare the `black 
International' of the Catholics with the `red 
International' of the socialists. Some decades later, 
the 1931 encyclical letter Quadragesimo Anno 
outlined a comprehensive programme for such 
social reforms. Its subtitle runs: “On the restoration 
of social order and its completion according to the 
law of the Gospel”. And it concludes by 
summoning all Catholics to set up organizations 
and to fight for the realization of this programme 
(Pius XI, 1931).  
 Through this strategy, Catholicism managed in 
many states to remain in and even to advance to a 
position of social and political prominence. 
Nevertheless, the church continued to condemn 
modernity as if it were totally and wrongfully 
excluded. As time progressed, it became more and 
more difficult to keep up this stance. The post-war 
triumphs of Western democracy and consumer 
society made the church's discourse less and less 
plausible. The second Vatican Council, which took 
place during the glorious early 1960s, shaped a new 
image: the church as an interpreter of the `signs of 
the times', as a companion traveller and partner of 
modernity, as the guide in the modern world. No 
longer did the church condemn modernity. It now 
recognized freedom of religion and human rights as 
important assets. The church set out, albeit 
belatedly, to keep pace with modernity. For the 
latter had proved to be not so much a usurper as the 
church's forerunner. Aggiornamento became the 
key word, that is: bringing the church closer to 
modern times, adapting Catholicism to modernity. 
It was a reversal of its position during the 19th 
century. Instead of rejecting modernity as a dark 
and godless force, the church now sounded hopeful 
– in particular in its council document Gaudium et 
Spes (1965) - that the church and the good forces of 
the modern world united would be able to build a 
common house for all people. 
 This optimism did not last long. The latent and 
lingering crisis within the church during the pre-
council period came to a full explosion in the 
1960s. The liberalization, inaugurated by the 
Vatican Council, could not turn the tide. On the 
contrary, the radicalization that followed Vatican II 
- the demand for democracy within the church, for 
a revision of sexual morals, for a lifting of celibacy 
for Roman Catholic priests, etc. – all these became 
a thorn in the side of conservative believers. 
Confronted with rapid church decline, on the one 
hand, and with increasing internal tensions and 









to intervene in order to straighten things out. 
Doctrinal orthodoxy became important once again - 
Humanae Vitae (1968) can be seen as the turning 
point here. Conservative priests were appointed as 
bishops, sometimes against the expressed wish of 
the diocese. The cautious devolution process which 
Vatican II had started, was redirected toward more 
centralization. It seemed almost as if the centre no 
longer trusted its followers. The resulting 
restoration which Paul VI had begun, was 
continued and strengthened under John Paul II. In 
the same vein, the tone of church leaders talking 
about modernity once again turned more distant 
and negative. The wish to learn from others and 
particularly from the modern world has been taken 
back, stressing once more the point that the 
church's doctrine is right (cf. John Paul II in 
Veritatis Splendor, 1993:4 en 5). Instead of stand-
ing critically with the modern world, the church 
attacks its excesses (a comparison between Popu-
lorum Progressio from 1967 with Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis from 1987 – the latter is meant to update 
the former — illustrates the point). 
 Let me summarize. I have added a fourth period 
to the three MacSweeney discerned: (1) from the 
French Revolution to 1878; (2) from 1878 (Leo 
XIII) to roughly the 1960s; (3) the 1960s, the years 
during and shortly after Vatican II; (4) the post-
1968 period. These four periods correspond with 
the four positions the Catholic church adopted vis-
à-vis modernity: (1) total rejection of a licentious 
and impermanent disorder; (2) competition against 
a hostile order; (3) alliance; (4) alternative voice. 
These, in turn, are bound up with four self-images 
of the church: (1) victim of temporary, 
revolutionary agitation; (2) counterpower fighting a 
fearsome enemy; (3) partnership with modernity; 
(4) embattled minority group. These also link with 
the mirror images of how the church perceived 
modernity: (1) sinful interruption; (2) secular 
power; (3) partner; (4) social context hostile to the 
church.  
 In general it seems that the church, with an 
exception for the optimistic early 1960s, has always 
encountered modernity with distrust and hostility. 
In the eyes of the Catholic church, religion and 
modernity do not seem to go together well. The 
antithesis and the tensions between them have 
always been a matter of prime importance. Before 
1960 these were interpreted in a more personal 
way: in the opinion of the church, the supporters of 
modernity and its new order harboured evil 
intentions toward the church. After the 1960s a 
more structural explanation came to the fore, one 
that was in fact much more pessimistic: the modern 
world may well be the world in which all of us live, 
but its affluence, its passion for fast and shallow 
entertainment, and its cynicism do not urge us 
toward a deepening of religious insights and 
experiences. The whole evolution throughout these 
four phases illustrates to what extent the power of 
the church has shrunk over the last two centuries: 
once the powerful ally of the ruling elite, now a 
minority church. And, conversely, it shows to what 
extent modernity has won respect: once an 
uncertain vision of future times propagated by 
innovators, now the inescapable driving force that 
shapes our life and social environment alike. 
 
Diagram 1:  
Timeline with relations between Church and modernity 
Period  RC view   RC attitude     self-image of 
 of modernity towards modernity RC church 
1789-1878 temporary   rejection    victim of revol. 
 disorder        agitation 
1878-1962 hostile order competition   counterpower 
1962-1968 partner   cooperation   partner 
1968-   irreligious   countervoice   embattled  










Modernity and modernization of Catholicism  
 
We have reviewed how the Catholic church 
adapted an attitude based predominantly upon 
suspicion and rejection of modernity. The outside 
world also saw an irresolvable tension or antithesis 
between Catholicism and modernity and, more 
generally, between religion and modernity. 
 Before 1960, at the time of polarization, anti-
clerical groups often perceived religion as some-
thing doomed to disappear because it was said to be 
a relic dating back to pre-modern times. It is true 
that this polarization, and with it, the denunciation 
of religion as such, ebbed away after 1960. But 
then, the rapid decline of the church, especially in 
Europe, evoked in a new way the view that there 
was indeed an unbridgeable gap between religion 
and modernity. Confronted with the spectacular fall 
in church membership and church attendance, the 
structural problems modernity had created for 
religion, were pointed to: functional differentiation, 
the anonymity of mass society and rationalization 
were considered to constitute crucial elements in a 
process of modernization that inevatibly leads to 
the marginalization of religion (for a summary see 
Wallis, Bruce, 1992). Although this is an important 
theme, I do not want to explore the problem of 
secularization any further here (Hellemans, 1998 
gives a preliminary exploration).  
 Since the 1990s, new developments have en-
ticed me to approach the issue of religion versus 
modernity from a different angle and to attempt to 
overcome the view which stresses the inherent 
opposition between them. One of these develop-
ments is the insight that secularization theory gives 
only one side of the picture, the decline side. 
Secularization has certainly led to a spectacular fall 
in membership of the larger churches, but it has not 
done away with churches and even less with 
religion. In this modern secular world, how is 
religious life and church life still possible? What 
forms do they take? These are fundamental 
questions. Furthermore, religion and the churches 
— even the Catholic church — seem to be losing 
the negative connotations that they have carried 
over the past two centuries: being old, obsolete, 
outdated. On the contrary, there are some indica-
tions — to give two examples, the growing interest 
for mysticism and the success of the Catholic 
World Youth Days — that there is renewed interest 
in, and a more positive attitude toward religion. 
Conversely, modernity is losing some of its 
normative drive and attractiveness. The dangers 
related to modernity — intensified warfare, envi-
ronmental pollution, stress and uncertainty — are 
nowadays as obvious as its advantages (cf. post-
modernism). If religion still has a future, and if 
modernity is losing the mythical splendour that 
surrounded it in the 1960s, then the antithetical 
discourse loses its plausibility. 
 In other words, the times in which we live force 
us to give up our conception of an antithesis 
between religion and modernity. Instead of 
opposing religion and modernity, I would like to 
argue in favour of a close interaction between the 
two. This new approach must however give up the 
conceptual imagery of religion and modernity as 
being two independent, external and equivalent 
entities. From being an illegitimate temporary 
interval or — from a different perspective — a 
half-baked social ideal, modernity has risen to 
become the universal context, the matrix in which 
all forms of social life exist, including religious life. 
It is clear now that religion and the much reduced 
churches operate within the context of modernity. 
This implies that modernity has to be circumscribed 
more broadly as a generic, encompassing concept 
pertaining to structural characteristics such as 
industrialized money economies, state-organized 
political systems, public standardized education, 
functional differentiation (Luhmann, 1992). Thus 
modernity, the `present-day civilization' so 
abhorred by Pius IX, turned out to be less an 
external adversary that could be beaten, than the 
broad context in which Catholicism existed from 
the French Revolution onward. This is an 
intellectual perspective that would have been 









years ago. In fact it is a view which implies the 
existence of our present world, of a victorious 
modernity and of churches with strongly 
diminished backing and membership. 
 This view interprets religion, and by implication 
Catholicism, no longer as opposed to modernity, 
but as an evolving part of a likewise evolving 
modernity. Religions in modernity should therefore 
be considered as thoroughly modern. This may at 
first sight seem to be a merely semantic exercise: 
we define religions as being modern. To a certain 
extent this is true, but that is not the point. What is 
essential is the opening of a new research 
perspective, the invitation to understand the 
modernity of religions in modernity. Instead of 
defining the distinctive features of a religion — 
Catholicism for instance — in opposition to an 
idealized version of modernity, such as tradition 
versus change or God versus secularism, we are 
now spurred on to closely examine the various 
ways in which religions and modernity interact, 
how religions permanently and creatively respond 
to the threats and opportunities to the models and 
ideas, to the movements and developments 
generated in and by modern society. It is all very 
similar to individual people and the ways in which 
they interact with the world in which they live. 
Through their constant activity within the 
framework of modern society, religions and the 
churches modernize themselves as well. It makes 
the post-1800 religions, notwithstanding their 
references to the past and their aversion to 
modernity, structurally and ideologically very 
different from their pre-modern manifestations. 
Thus our research must now focus on the process of 
modernization within religions, a notion which 
until very recently seemed to be nothing less than a 
contradiction in terms (Hellemans, 1997).  
 For the study of Catholicism, this approach 
promises to be very fruitful. Catholicism was 
unequalled in its stubborn opposition to modernity, 
but at the same time it is one of the most successful 
churches in modernity. The 18th century Ancien 
Régime church was state-allied and federated. In 
the 19th century, it was turned into a state 
independent, centralized mass organization, capable 
of integrating and mobilizing large sections of the 
population. In fact, the church was the first non-
state mass organization of modernity, long before 
other mass organizations made headway after 1880. 
Under Leo XIII and his successors, this mass 
organizational model was extended to more secular 
areas and so the many large Catholic lay 
organizations came into being (professional 
organizations, educational and charitable 
organizations, cultural and recreational orga-
nizations, even trade unions and political parties). 
Internally this caused a lot of friction, for instance 
between bishops and prominent members of lay 
organizations, but at the same time it gave the 
Catholic church unprecedented power and 
influence. Another example of religious modern-
ization with great effect is its missionary work. The 
Catholic church allied itself, from early on, with the 
project of colonization. Driven by a colonial, 
`civilizing' spirit and supported by its well-
organized structure, its manpower and its 
entrepreneurial spirit, its missionary work in the 
non-Western world reached its apogee in the 19th 
and early 20th century. It made the Catholic church 
the world's largest single religious community. 
Other aspects of 19th-century and early 20th-
century Catholicism, such as the rise of neo-
Scholasticism (Thibault, 1972) or neo-Gothic art 
and architecture (De Maeyer, Verpoest, 2000), the 
propagation of Gregorian Chant or the development 
of social doctrine (Hellemans, 2000), can equally 
be interpreted as successful manifestations of 
religious modernization.  
 What is important in all of this is that modern-
ization and modern are no longer on a par with 
liberal or progressive. Conservatives and even 
people with reactionary ideas are no less modern 
than liberals and progressives. They too take part in 
modernity, although their appreciation and 
evaluation of it differ fundamentally from that of 
their liberal adversaries. This also applies to the 









modernity and yet very critically disposed toward 
it. One might say that the Catholic church over the 
past two centuries, with the exception of the 
Vatican II period, has been modernizing while 
maintaining an anti-modernist stance. Anti-mod-
ernist modernization is indeed the label that, in my 
view, best captures the double and ambiguous 
`performance' of Catholicism in the modern world: 
objectively rooted in, and yet subjectively 
stubbornly resisting modernity.  
 
Present and future situations 
 
How does this approach, which highlights the 
modernity and continuous religious modernization 
of Catholicism, help us to understand the present 
situation of the Catholic church? 
 First, it puts into perspective the opposition 
between progressives and conservatives. It is not 
my intention to deny the differences between the 
two. Present church policy, correctly in my view, is 
said to be conservative. The differences with the 
liberal reform movement during and immediately 
following the second Vatican Council are clear: re-
centralization from Rome, emphasis on Catholic 
doctrine and the specific identity of the church — 
with connotations pointing back to the time-
honoured `nulla salus extra ecclesiam' — the 
stream of beatifications and canonizations, etc. 
From a progressive point of view this type of 
conservatism is doomed in advance because it is 
thought to be in opposition with `modernity'. This 
thesis I will dispute. Modernity leaves room for 
many strategies. The labels `progressive' and 
`conservative' summarize the two main directions 
in an oversimplified way. One cannot exclude a 
priori the success of anti-modernistic moderniza-
tion: it is precisely the prosperity of the church 
before 1960 which proves to many conservatives 
the correctness of their strategy. But neither should 
one accept literally the conservatives' claim that 
only they guarantee continuity with the past and 
that they do no more than transmit orthodoxy in an 
undamaged way. They obscure the impact of the 
processes of religious modernization which are 
constantly at work. The past never comes back. 
Post-1800 Catholicism is very different from pre-
1800 Catholicism. In the same sense pre-1960 
Catholicism is also passé. What is developing now 
is not a rebirth of a former type of Catholicism, but 
a new type of Catholicism. The outlines and 
challenges of this new Catholicism need to be 
discovered and made more explicit. The religious 
modernization perspective seems to be very 
suitable for this purpose because it focuses on the 
permanent and multifaceted `production' of 
religion, on the `making' of religion which is 
always in the present even when it harks back to the 
past. Whether this new Catholicism will be 
conservative or progressive in nature is, 
analytically speaking, a question of secondary 
importance.  
 What does it mean to talk about a new type of 
Catholicism? I already discerned four phases of 
Catholicism. This, however, was not completely 
correct because these phases are not alike. The first 
and the second phase dovetail very tightly. In fact 
they form one larger period, namely ultramontane 
mass Catholicism. The third phase was until 
recently — i.e., from Vatican II to the 1980s — 
considered to be a definitive new period (see 
McSweeney, 1980 and Coleman, 1978). It now 
seems to have been a mere transitional phase, an in-
between stage, which lasted for only a limited 
number of years, two decades at the most. This 
new, coarser periodization into two periods ties up 
with the more recent historical and sociological 
literature which distinguishes the first, industrial 
modernity from a second, post-industrial, reflexive 
modernity (see, particularly, Beck, 1986). The 
1960s again mark the cut-off line. Many things 
have changed in these years and thereafter: 
globalization of the economy, the end of `old' 
politics and decolonization, growing 
individualization, new ways of life, etc. Modernity 
as a whole enters into a new period. Precisely what 
this will look like, is hard to tell. The structures 









 The evolution of Catholicism shows, in my 
opinion, a similar development. The ultramontane 
form of mass Catholicism developed in response to 
industrial modernity. It took several decades, from 
the French Revolution to about 1850, before the 
basic structures of this new church formation found 
a stable shape: the centralized church, led from 
Rome, socializing and mobilizing the great mass of 
followers under firm clerical leadership. One can, 
as we did, distinguish various sub-formations over 
this long period. The first phase, under Pius IX, 
coincides with the days of liberal capitalism. The 
second phase, starting with Leo XIII, where 
organized Catholicism was to expand into the 
secular domain, coincides with organized 
capitalism. In the past decades we have been 
witnessing the demolition both of this Western-
based, organized capitalism (Offe, 1985) and of 
ultramontane mass Catholicism. The disintegration 
of these once stable structures — and patterns of 
thought — has led to an uncountable number of 
experiments and searches in various directions. We 
cannot say that this has already issued in a new, 
stable order. As far as religion is concerned, this 
will only be the case once the process of 
secularization has been completed. Only then will it 
be clear how many people the churches will still be 
able to reach and which structures are viable (for 
instance, will it still be possible for a priestly type 
of church to be adequately manned?). So we have 
to be careful. But I also think that we have moved 
far enough into the transition period so that some of 
the major outlines of the new religious formation 
are becoming visible. 
 I would like to explore some of the future 
scenarios. In my opinion, the secularization over 
the last decades in the West is an irreversible fact. 
The distinction between religion in general — all 
forms of activity aimed at linking immanence with 
transcendence — and the churches — all forms of 
organized religion — is my starting point. The 
distinction is necessary because, definitely after 
1960, many religious activities took place outside 
the larger churches (consider, for example, the role 
of New-Age book shops). The future of the 
churches may go in two different directions: they 
may go on playing a vital role, be it as smaller 
churches or denominations or they may sink into 
marginality. Something similar applies to religion 
as a whole: either it continues to attract a large 
number of people or it shrinks into insignificance. 
Combined into a matrix this gives four possible 
scenarios for the future.  
 
Diagram 2:  
Scenarios stating the future of religion and the churches  
 
-  Religion  + 
(1) a-religious society  (3) invisible religion church(es) 
(2) residue churches  (4) thriving churches 
 
Scenario 1 anticipates continuing decline of the 
churches and a diminishing interest in religious 
matters. The final result will be an a-religious 
society without churches or with micro churches as 
moribund reminders of present-day large churches. 
Scenario 2 also demonstrates a lack of interest in 
religion. Yet some small but vigorous churches 
remain active. These will be small residue churches 
and they will stubbornly and provocatively 
continue to fight the a-religious society in which 
they have to operate. Expressed in negative terms, 
we could call this the sect scenario. In scenario 3 
the large churches gradually decline, but the 
interest for a (churchless) religion stays alive. The 
result would be a barely institutionalized `invisible 
religion' (Luckmann, 1967). `New Age' is an 
example of this tendency. Scenario 4 provides a 
future image of a lively religious field in which the 
(now smaller) churches continue to play a key role. 
The churches in this scenario stay vigorous and 
know how to capitalize on the vague and 
fluctuating religious needs of the people. 
 The diagram cannot tell us what will happen in 
reality. It is an analytical blueprint with various 
possible scenarios. We have to be aware of the fact 
that each religious constellation, because of the 









contains some fundamental tensions. At the time of 
organized confessionalism, the Catholic variant of 
which was ultramontane mass Catholicism, the 
polarization between the organized confessional 
and anti-clericalist blocks was one of these 
inherent, irreconcilable tensions. Our analytical 
diagram points toward a new tension, namely 
between the churches as organized forms of reli-
gion and a detached public. If we look at scenarios 
2 and 4, we can grasp this tension in the opposition 
between the residue and the thriving churches 
scenarios. In the previous religious formation, the 
churches had managed to closely involve believers 
in the churches and to turn them into a militant 
group of followers. After 1960, due to increased 
individualization, that trend reversed. People, even 
church members, identify themselves less with 
`their' church. Apart from church leaders and a 
small core group of fervent adherents, almost 
everyone else, including active church members, 
has turned into full or partial outsiders. The once 
broad and obedient following has become a 
detached, critical public. This raises the question as 
to how, and to what extent the public can still be 
reached. The lesser the public's religious interests, 
the more likely it is that the residue church scenario 
will come about. Likewise, the more church leaders 
think that interest is lacking and consequently 
behave accordingly, the more likely the residue 
church scenario will be. This is what is commonly 
referred to as a `self fulfilling prophecy'. Deciding 
which policy to pursue — a `holy residue' policy or 
a `general public' policy — will therefore constitute 
an important area of tension.  
 This may be further accentuated if scenario 3, 
that of an `invisible religion', is taken into con-
sideration. Opinion polls repeatedly show that a lot 
of people claim to believe in God, life after death, 
and other religious postulates, while being un-
churched. In 1990 70% of all Europeans claimed to 
believe in God whereas `only' 39% reported going 
to church at least once a month (Davie, 1999: 69-
70). Grace Davie labels this phenomenon 
`believing without belonging'. According to Davie, 
these people believe, but the additional step toward 
church membership and participation is not taken. 
The question remains how literally these belief 
statements are to be taken. Do these non-churched 
people really believe in God and the other topics, or 
do they merely indicate that they would like to 
believe, not knowing precisely what to believe in? 
If so, they have expressed not so much a belief, i.e. 
the echo of an institutionalized belief, but rather a 
longing for religion without specification. Viewed 
from this perspective, the `invisible religion' 
scenario does not refer to people who privately 
adhere to a specific form of faith and religious 
experiences. Rather, it records a condition in which 
people long for religion in a very vague and 
desultory way without being able to make this 
longing more explicit and experience it in reality. 
In that case scenario 3 does not refer to `believing 
without belonging', but rather to `longing without 
belonging'. Admittedly, this is a gloomy 
interpretation for the churches. It is also one that 
needs further empirical foundations. But if that line 
of reasoning is correct, it underlines how difficult it 
will be in the future for the churches to reach a 
population which might be vaguely interested in 
religious matters. 
 Let us now return to the more specific question 
of what contours the new form of Catholicism will 
adopt. I circumscribe it provisionally as a 
multifaceted, choice Catholicism. To enable a quick 
comparison, I will contrast the new church 











Diagram 3:  
 
Ultramontane Mass CatholicismMultifaceted Choice Catholicism 
Italo-Western world church  globalized, multicultural world church  
Roman-homogenizingdualization between Roman-oriented top tives and the relatively 
autonomous grass roots level 
intensive socialization smaller choice church versus a vaguely inter- 
 of native Catholicsested public 
organized sub-society polarization between the factions 
church within a wider societycompeting churches in a turbulent religious field 
 
The most fundamental characteristic in my opinion 
seems to be that the Catholic church in the Western 
world, like the other great churches, is turning into 
a minority and choice church. Secularization in the 
second half of the 20th century has put an end to 
the integration of large parts of the population into 
the Catholic church, thereby also putting an end to 
the polarization between clericalist and anti-
clericalist factions. The Catholic church now turns 
into a choice church for believers who consciously 
make a choice in its favour. Every now and then 
segments of the wider public will seek limited 
contacts with the church in order to emphasize 
crucial individual transitions such as marriage and 
death or to come to terms with special collective 
events such as the death of princess Diana, the 
Estonia accident or the murders of innocent 
children. Moreover, in contrast with the past, the 
Catholic church is now one of many religious 
actors in a competitive religious field. This does not 
mean that the Catholic church will sink away. As 
large businesses and political parties have shown in 
the economic and political arenas, large 
organizations can survive very well in a 
competitive environment. They have a wealth of 
resources at their disposal which enable them to 
cope with unprecedented and radically new 
situations. The most difficult matter to give an 
opinion on is the future internal structure of the 
Catholic church. At this moment there is a gap 
between the Rome-oriented executive staff and the 
largely autonomous church life in the parishes. It is 
likely that a modus vivendi will be worked out 
between unity at the top and diversity in the lower 
regions of a multicultural world church. How this 
relationship is shaped will depend on strategic 
policy choices such as the one between orthodoxy 
and liberalization. The most likely outcome will be 
an oscillation between the two options. 
 
Conclusion: 
Is this the end of the Catholic intellectual? 
 
I have focused my attention on the broad charac-
terization of the relationship between Catholicism 
and modernity. More important than the opposition 
between the two is, in my opinion, the way in 
which Catholicism is embedded in modernity. We 
have to scrutinize closely the ongoing processes of 
religious modernization and their enshrinement in 
changing church structures. The previous two 
centuries of Catholicism and modernity can then be 
described as the formation and disintegration of one 
church formation (i.e., ultramontane mass 
Catholicism) and later, over the last decades, as the 
shaping of an entirely new church formation (i.e., 
multifaceted choice Catholicism). This is the 
framework within which Catholic intellectuals have 
been and are still working.  
 Looking at the issue from this perspective, the 
label `Catholic intellectual' seems strongly linked 
with the church formation of ultramontane mass 
Catholicism. Catholicism was at that time the basis 
upon which an entire sub-society was built. Every 
true Catholic was supposed to live his life within 
the Catholic fold under the active guidance of the 
church. He was also expected, if necessary, to stand 
up for his church, its interests and projects. This 
was certainly the case for Catholic intellectuals. As 
representatives of a dubious category, the leaders of 
the church distrusted them. At the same time, 
however, they were important as defenders of the 
Catholic faith and worldview against their secular 
and protestant colleagues. The adjective `Catholic' 
was clearly more important than the noun 









who left a permanent mark in the domain of the 
social sciences and literature are rare. In the domain 
of Catholic intellectual traditions things went better 
because here the focus was less on strong 
individual performances and more on intellectual 
school building. This was better suited to 
Catholicism, with its long-standing emphasis on the 
collectivity and on organizations. Thus, many 
Catholic universities were founded in the period of 
ultramontane mass Catholicism and a number of 
influential traditions such as neo-Thomistic 
theology, Catholic social doctrine, Catholic 
sociology, etc., came into being. 
 Because they were so closely interwoven with 
ultramontane mass Catholicism, both the `Catholic 
intellectual' and the `Catholic intellectual tradition' 
ran into major problems after 1960. In general, 
when a social formation dissolves, there are three 
possible types of discourse: either one focuses on 
continuity; or one highlights the end; or, as a type 
of middle course, one stresses the transformation 
process. The deep rift between the old and the new 
form of Catholicism makes a discourse of sheer 
continuity less plausible — consider how the 
church moved from a position of supremacy to 
being a minority and choice church. More 
convincing is the type of discourse that focuses on 
the end of the Catholic intellectual and intellectual 
traditions. The Catholic intellectual, reasoning 
under the supervision of and for the church, has 
virtually disappeared. This        
holds true even for Catholic theologians. The 
reason is simple: because the Catholic church is no 
longer the core of an entire sub-society, it can no 
longer constitute the basic social and intellectual 
framework for its intellectuals. 
 Likewise many Catholic traditions have disap-
peared. The once so dominant neo-Thomistic 
school finds every now and then a faint echo in a 
Papal encyclical letter, but mostly it has become the 
object of study for historical theologians. Catholic 
sociology disappeared altogether. Catholic social 
doctrine — now called social teaching — has better 
prospects for survival and is a possible candidate 
for the third type of discourse, the transformation 
discourse (McHugh, Verstraeten, 2000). There is a 
fair chance that even in the future there will still be 
some sort of Catholic intellectuals. At the moment 
we cannot answer the question how many and how 
important they will be. In any case, leaving aside a 
small number of paid officials, the church will no 
longer be in any position to control these 
intellectuals. They will reflect on the church and 
think with the church. Undoubtedly, some Catholic 
traditions will also continue to live on and new 
ones will emerge. Traditions which stand close to 
the core tasks of the church such as Catholic social 
teaching, or liturgical and mystical traditions, have 
the best chances of being passed down. In any 
event, the church can no longer claim to be the 
intellectual centre of an entire world or sub-society. 
It can only hope — and do the best it can — to 
constitute an attractive meeting point for intellec-
tuals who are sensitive to religious matters. The 
condition, however, is that the church welcomes the 
sincere, independent, probing research of 
intellectuals. In other words, the condition is that 
the church manages to escape the rigorous real-
ization of the sect scenario. 
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